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In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, many evacuees from the Gulf region began the 
difficult process of deciding whether to rebuild or restart elsewhere. We examine pre-
Katrina Gulf residents’ decision to return to the post-disaster Gulf region—which we call 
the “return migration” decision.  We estimate two separate return migration models, first 
utilizing data from a mail survey of individuals in the affected region and then focusing 
on self-administered questionnaires of evacuees in Houston.  Our results indicate that 
return migration can be affected by household income; age; education level; employment, 
marital and home ownership status; but the results depend upon the population under 
consideration.  We find no impact of “connection to place” on the return migration 
decision.  While the impact of income is relatively small, we find that the real wage 
differential between home and host region influences the likelihood of return.  Larger 
implicit costs, in terms of foregone wages for returning, induce a lower likelihood of 
return.  Exploiting this difference at the individual level, we are able to produce estimates 
of willingness to pay to return home.  Average WTP to return home for a sample of 
relatively poor households is estimated at $1.94 per hour or $3,954 per year. 
JEL classifications: I3, J6, Q54, R23 
 
  11. Introduction 
Upwards of one million residents of the greater metropolitan New Orleans area 
evacuated on the 27
th and 28
th of August 2005, just before Hurricane Katrina struck the 
Gulf Coast.  Evacuees from other parts of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama fled the 
coast in large numbers, marking Hurricane Katrina as the largest population displacement 
in the United States since the Dust Bowl of the 1930s (Falk, Hunt, and Hunt 2006).  Post-
disaster recovery and rebuilding in the Gulf region requires understanding the existing 
risks, communicating those risks to the public, rethinking land uses, deciding on methods 
to correct deficiencies in public infrastructure, and providing incentives for economic 
recovery that will give firms and households an opportunity to survive and thrive.  In the 
case of New Orleans, recovery may take up to 11 years or more (Kates et al. 2006).  
While many issues remain to be resolved in determining what will become of New 
Orleans and the Gulf region, the economic, social, and cultural future of the Gulf region 
will be significantly influenced by who decides to return.  In the face of variable but 
widespread destruction, salient vulnerability, and uncertain prospects, evacuees must 
choose whether to return to their home. 
As Katrina approached, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana all issued 
mandatory evacuation orders.  In New Orleans, 70,000 people remained, some by choice, 
but most without means of escape (U.S. Congress CGR 2006).  Many evacuees who 
sought refuge from Katrina had nowhere to return to after the storm.  Immediately after 
the storm, roughly 275,000 people were forced into group shelters (FEMA 2006a).   
Between mid August and mid November of 2005, 250,000 people lost their jobs (U.S. 
  2Congress CBO 2006).  Without homes or jobs, many people were forced to decide 
whether to restock and rebuild their lives along the Gulf coast or to seek out a new 
location for residence. The National Hurricane Service estimated the total damage losses 
from Katrina at $81.2 billion (NWS 2006).  In the 117 hurricane-affected counties of the 
Gulf Coast, 40 declined in population between July 1, 2005 and January 1, 2006 (Frey 
and Singer 2006).  The greatest population losses occurred in the parishes and counties 
holding New Orleans, LA; Gulfport-Biloxi, MS; Lake Charles, LA; Pascagoula, MS; and 
Mobile, AL.   
In this paper, we examine the decision to return to the post-disaster Gulf region—
which we call the “return migration” decision.  We review economic models of 
household migration and build upon historical and empirical evidence of migration 
behavior in order to postulate on determinants of post-disaster return migration.  We 
identify important research questions that can be examined with return migration data.  
We explore stated preference return migration behavior using a number of datasets 
collected in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and make some inferences about socio-
economic determinants and impacts of the return migration decision. 
2. Economic Models of Household Migration 
Economists have long recognized that economic factors influence the migration 
patterns of households.  Sjaastad (1962) provides a theoretical framework for the decision 
to migrate, defining the problem in terms of a household’s search to maximize the net 
economic return on human capital.  In this framework, migration is viewed as an 
equilibrating force in the labor market—real wage differences between regions or cities 
  3create arbitrage opportunities that can be realized by migration, leading to a redistribution 
of households across the landscape.  Early models focused on interspatial wage 
differentials, distance between origin and destination, labor market conditions—such as 
unemployment rate and growth in employment—and household characteristics as factors 
determining migration flows (Greenwood 1975; Graves 1979, 1980; Greenwood and 
Hunt 1989).  
Models of household migration typically employ a modified gravity modeling 
structure.  Migration flows are assumed proportional to origin and destination 
populations, but inversely related to distance.  It has been well documented that migration 
rates decline with distance, though it is generally believed that out-of-pocket monetary 
expenses could not alone explain this phenomenon.  Moving expenses tend to be a 
relatively small part of the net returns to migrating.  Other explanations include 
opportunity costs of time, psychic costs of moving (diminution of contact with family and 
friends, change of environment, etc.), higher search costs associated with greater 
distances, and uncertainty about destinations (Greenwood 1997).  The existence of these 
potential barriers to migration has created concern about the efficacy of migration in 
reallocating resources in response to changing market and demographic conditions. 
Migration decisions vary across individual households.  Economic factors such as 
worker skills and employment status will influence returns to migration.  Life-cycle 
considerations and the availability of information may also influence migration.  One 
would expect some correspondence between migration and changes in life stages—for 
example, children moving away from home, the completion of school by a family 
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employment depend upon flow of information on employment opportunities, which may 
explain why previous-period net migration rates are positively correlated with current 
migration trends (Greenwood 1969).  Social networks may play a role in learning about 
labor market opportunities and providing support for migration.  Especially among race-
ethnic minority groups, research suggests that migration patterns tend to follow well-
worn pathways and networks (Bean and Tienda 1987; Farley and Allen 1987; Barringer, 
Gardner, and Levin 1993). 
Individuals might also be influenced through learning about amenities in different 
locations.  Sjaastad (1962) considered location-specific amenities (including climate, 
smog, and congestion) as factors that might affect returns to migration, but characterized 
them as unimportant in evaluating migration as a redistributive mechanism since they 
entail no resource cost.  This notion does suggest, however, that location-specific 
amenities may affect the reservation wage of households, and thus that wage schedules 
could be conditional on amenity levels. A subsequent branch of literature adopted this 
perspective, assuming wages, rents, and the prices of locally produced non-traded goods 
adjust in response to location-specific exogenous factors, such as local environmental 
conditions or fiscal considerations, so that utility and profit levels (rather than wages and 
land rents) are equalized across regions.  Under this characterization, persistent 
differences in wages and rents compensate for amenity levels; they need not equalize 
across regions or cities in the long run unless the locations have identical amenities. 
  5Roback (1982) shows how wages and land rents are simultaneously determined in 
an equilibrium setting, conditional on the level of local amenities.  In this context, 
amenities are non-manufactured attributes that are valued by households—such as 
temperature, rainfall, and cleanliness of environment—or goods and services that vary in 
availability spatially—such as professional sports teams, performing arts, cultural 
resources (i.e. museums), etc.  In Roback’s model, interregional wages and rent 
differentials can persist and will reflect the value of location-specific amenities.  This 
formulation of household migration follows the hedonic model formalized by Rosen 
(1974) in the sense that implicit values of location-specific amenities are reflected in the 
markets for labor, land, and other locally produced goods and services. 
Clark and Cosgrove (1991) examine the persistency of interregional wage 
differentials.  They find evidence that supports both the human capital approach of 
Sjaastad and the compensating differentials model of Roback.  Amenities tend to have a 
significant negative effect on wages, but wage differentials persist across regions even 
when amenities are controlled.  Greenwood et al. (1991) provide evidence of 
disequilibrium in U.S. internal migration between states—real income in amenity rich 
states tends to be too high and real income in amenity poor areas tends to be too low. 
Frey and Liaw (2005) identify cultural constraints—such as need for social 
support networks, kinship ties, and access to informal employment opportunities—as 
shaping the migration patterns of race-ethnicity groups.  Empirical evidence suggests that 
minority residence in an ethnically concentrated metropolitan area can inhibit out-
migration (Tienda and Wilson 1992).  Thus, persistent differentials may reflect cultural 
  6constraints in a number of ways: race-ethnic groups may traverse well-worn migration 
routes with less attention paid to wage differentials at other possible destinations; or 
connections to place
1 may inhibit out-migration.  The implications of this line of 
reasoning are that migration may not engender complete efficiency in the allocation of 
labor across space, as social and personal constraints may inhibit labor flow.  Greenwood 
et al. (1991) suggest that persistent wage differentials are relatively small, so that 
efficiency loss could be minor.  However, exploration and inference about social 
connections is something that, to our knowledge, has not been explored.  Such an 
analysis is best pursued with micro-level data. 
3. Examining Return Migration 
A number of papers have looked at the decision to evacuate prior to hurricane 
landfall (Baker 1991; Gladwin and Peacock 1997; Dow and Cutter 1997; Whitehead et al. 
2000; Whitehead 2005).  Results generally suggest that storm intensity, evacuation 
orders, perception of flood risk, type of residence, pet ownership, and race/ethnicity 
influence the likelihood of evacuation.  Whitehead (2005) finds some evidence to support 
the validity of stated preference evacuation data.  
There has been much less research on post-disaster migration.  A disaster large 
enough to cause widespread displacement of a population will often cause extensive 
damage to personal property and infrastructure, limiting the ability of evacuees to return 
to their homes, businesses, and communities.  Depending upon the severity of the 
disaster, return access may be limited for weeks or months.  Uncertainty about the timing 
                                                 
1 “Place” is defined as a geographical unit in which identity is grounded (Gieryn 2000). 
  7and composition of return migration can hamper the recovery process, as many 
economic, civic, and social functions are largely population dependent.
2  The nature of 
return migration also affects reconstruction, as project prioritization and infrastructure 
capacity depend upon the returning population. 
Elliott and Pais (2006) examine evacuation, short-term recovery, emotional stress 
and support, and likelihood of return for Gulf coast residents in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina.  They find a high degree of uncertainty regarding the likelihood of return for 
those households still displaced one month after the storm.  They find homeowners are 
more likely to return than those that do not own property.  However those whose home 
was destroyed by the storm are less likely to return.  They also find that lower-income 
households are more likely to return.  Falk, Hunt, and Hunt (2006) argue that affluent 
households should be more likely to return post-disaster, as they are likely to be displaced 
to closer locations and they have better resources to make the return trip.  In the case of 
flooding disasters, affluent households are more likely to own homes in areas less likely 
to have been flooded, and have better resources to rebuild in the event that their home has 
been damaged.  Note that the results of Elliott and Pais correspond with households that 
had not returned one month after the disaster.  Thus, they are conditioned on their sample 
selection—those households that did not immediately return.  As such, the conjecture of 
Falk, Hunt, and Hunt may apply to the general population of evacuees. 
                                                 
2 For example, a survey of previous residents one year after a devastating earthquake 
revealed that 74% of unskilled workers had not returned to the area, while only 40% of 
skilled workers did not return (Bowden et al. 1977). 
  8Elliott and Pias also consider the effect of race, gender, age, timing of evacuation, 
whether the respondents are parents, and employment status on the likelihood of return.  
They find no statistical support for the significance of these covariates in the return 
migration decision.  Falk, Hunt, and Hunt (2006) speculate on the importance of sense of 
place as a factor affecting the likelihood of return.  They note that sense of place is likely 
to increase in strength when families or communities exist in an area for an extended 
period of time, perhaps over a number of generations.  Sense of place may keep 
households in an area through bad times—such as loss of job, economic recession, social 
turmoil, or natural disaster—even when moving elsewhere could afford better 
opportunity.  As such, sense of place might play a role in persistent wage and land rent 
differentials identified in the economic migration literature.  This notion is related to the 
psychic costs of moving identified by Sjaastad (1962).  Sense of place and a desire to 
rekindle community and social connections could affect the likelihood of return. 
Population displacement due to natural disaster offers an opportunity to examine 
the importance of sense of place in migration decisions.  Displacement creates an 
exogenous shock that uproots households that might have never chosen to leave their 
current location, despite differences in wages, prices, or amenities in other areas.  How do 
those households then respond given the current opportunities for employment and 
quality of life in their displaced location and their connection to the place from which 
they vacated?  This choice likely depends upon sense of place and connection to culture.  
With the right kind of data, one could examine the importance of culture and sense of 
place in the return migration decision and, by examining contingent wages in the 
  9displaced and home locations, could possibly get a sense of the compensating real wage 
differentials that would affect migration despite connection to place. 
Post-disaster perceptions may also affect the likelihood of return.  Natural 
disasters can expose shortcomings of certain locations or the way humans have developed 
the landscape leading to changing perceptions of vulnerability.  Those that perceive areas 
where they previously lived as suddenly more vulnerable would be less likely to return.  
Likewise, mistrust of government to provide risk management and handle emergency 
services could also influence return migration to high-hazard areas.  Lastly, expectations 
of housing and job availability as well as overall economic outlook could affect return 
migration.  In the next section, we develop an econometric model of the likelihood of 
post-disaster return that takes these aspects into account. 
4. Return Migration Decision 
Consider the return migration decision of a household that has recently evacuated 
prior to a natural disaster.  We consider this household displaced if they cannot 
immediately return to their home after the occurrence of the disaster.  Inability to return 
could reflect damage to their home or community, loss of critical infrastructure (such as 
roads, power, or flood protection), distance traveled for evacuation, uncertainty related to 
habitability of their home or continuation of employment, or some combination of  these 
factors.  We assume household decision making adheres to the tenets of rational choice, 
and thus the decision to return post-disaster reflects a weighing of benefits (B) and costs 
(C).  Thus, the probability of return is: 
  10Pr(return = 1) = Pr(B > C) ,         ( 1 )  
where return is a dummy variable indicating intention to return; B reflects connection to 
place, perceptions of vulnerability, damage to home and community, likelihood of 
reengaging in employment, and the likelihood of friends and family returning; and C 
reflects distance evacuated and wage differentials in the home and host cities.  The C 
vector might also include differences in prices and amenities in the home and host cities.   
Thus, quality of life factors and home-specific factors, such as connections to 
place and individual perceptions and expectations of future conditions, should play a role 
in the decision to return.  Under the assumption that evacuees can find a job in their host 
and home cities, a cost of returning home is the change in real wages associated with the 
return.  With persistent interregional wage differentials, the loss in real wages stemming 
from return migration could be significant.  On the other hand, wages in the host region 
could be less than that of the home region, so the wage differential would be a negative 
cost.  The wage differential will reflect economic conditions in the home and host city 
and labor characteristics of the household. 
The household return migration decision has implications for the economic and 
social recovery of the region affected by natural disaster.  The pool of labor that returns 
(e.g. skilled vs. unskilled) may affect economic activity and industry performance.  While 
we would expect market adjustments to equilibrate demand and supply of labor over 
time, shortages or gluts of specific types of labor could cause short term problems in 
recovery.   The availability of housing may exacerbate labor problems—if unskilled labor 
tends to rent housing and rental properties are neglected in early recovery efforts, then the 
  11return rate of unskilled labor may be relatively low.  This could be a problem for New 
Orleans, since the tourism-based economy of the city relies heavily on unskilled labor 
(Falk, Hunt, and Hunt 2006).  Demographics of returning households have implications 
for the public and private sectors of the economies—are families with school-age 
children likely to return?  How should local school districts plan for their return? 
The return migration decision can also be explored from the standpoint of non-
market valuation.  Consider the economic value of returning home, maximum willingness 
to pay (WTP), with WTPi = xi'β + εi, where xi is a vector of household characteristics and 
εi is an i.i.d. logistic random error term with zero mean.  The conditional probability of 
return can be rewritten:  
Pr(return=1|xi) = Pr(WTPi(xi, εi) > Ci),
3        ( 2 )  
Consider the real wage differential as the primary cost of return: Ci = whost – 
whome.  Ignoring other potential costs
4, we have: 
Pr(return=1|xi) = Pr(xi'β + εi > Ci)           
 = Pr(εi > Ci – xi'β) 
 = Pr(xi'β – Ci > εi) 
                                                 
3 Haab and McConnell  (2002) illustrate that the willingness to pay function approach is 
equivalent to a utility difference model (the basis of most discrete choice models) if 
utility is linear in parameters and the marginal utility of income is constant across the 
discrete choice states (in our case, going home or remaining in the host city). 
4 Since they are likely to be very small relative to the present value of the wage 
differential and will only be incurred once, we ignore the pecuniary and time costs of 
return. 
  12     = Pr((xi'β – Ci)/θ >zi),        (3) 
where  zi is a standard logistic random variate and θ = σ
2π
2/3.
5  As recognized by 
Cameron and James (1987), this formulation of dichotomous choice model allows for 
identification of point estimates of β and calculating fitted values of WTPi because the 
scale parameter is identified due to inclusion of a random cost parameter.  The parameter 
estimate on C from the logistic regression is a point estimate of -1/θ, so β in (3) can be 
recovered through a simple transformation.  In our case, the evacuation location must be 
exogenously imposed upon the household in order to render whost a random wage offer, 
and thus Ci exogenous to the household.  The expected benefit of return home for the 







− =       ( 4 )       
where  x is a vector of average household characteristics and βC is the parameter estimate 
of the wage difference.
6  Confidence intervals for WTP can be calculated using the 
Krinsky-Robb Monte Carlo procedure (1986). 
5. Empirical Analysis 
The eye of Hurricane Katrina made landfall in southeast Louisiana at 6:10 a.m. on 
August 29, 2005.  At landfall, Katrina had maximum winds of 125 mph, making it the 
third most intense hurricane on the US record (NWS 2006).  Hurricane Katrina 
                                                 
5 Line 3 of Equation (3) only holds for symmetric distribution of ε.  The logistic 
distribution is symmetric. 
6 WTP measure assumes constant marginal utility of income. 
  13devastated the Gulf coast.  The National Weather Service (2006) reports that in 
Mississippi, storm surge reached 28 feet in certain locations. In Louisiana and Alabama 
storm surge arrived at well above 10 feet.  Along the Mississippi coast, storm surge 
penetrated at least six miles, where preliminary estimates indicated 90% of structures 
within a half a mile of the coast were destroyed (CBS 2005; NWS 2006).  In New 
Orleans, levee breaches flooded 80% of the city.  In all, Hurricane Katrina affected 
roughly 90,000 square miles (FEMA 2006b).   
In response to Hurricane Katrina, the Center for Natural Hazards Research at East 
Carolina University conducted two separate surveys, each containing questions relevant 
to the evacuation behavior of individuals living within the affected areas.
7  The two 
surveys were both random samples of individuals in the affected region, as defined by 
U.S. Postal Service.
8  In both cases, we utilized a modified Dillman approach consisting 
of initial postcards indicating an upcoming survey and multiple waves of mailed surveys 
and follow-up postcards.  We used first-class postage to ensure that the U.S. Postal 
Service would send our postcards and surveys to the household’s forwarding address, and 
requested return service so that we could keep track of those households which could not 
be reached via mail.  Survey 1, which focused on the expenditure patterns of evacuees, 
had two waves of mailed surveys and survey 2, which focused on opinions of and 
preferences for rebuilding projects in New Orleans, consisted of three waves of mailed 
surveys.  Survey 2 also included additional phone contact to encourage participation.  In 
                                                 
7 These surveys were the result of two National Science Foundation grants: 1) (CMS 
0553108) “SGER: Collecting Economic Impact Data: Implications for Disaster Areas and 
Host Regions” and 2) (SES 0554987) “SGER: The “New” New Orleans: Evaluating 
Preferences for Rebuilding Plans after Hurricane Katrina.” 
8 These samples were purchased from Survey Sampling of Fairfield, CT. 
  14survey 1, our final targeted sample totaled 2,474 individuals within the affected region.  
Of these 2,474 individuals, 597 returned surveys – a 24% response rate.  Survey 2 
targeted 3,532 individuals of which, 730 were returned surveys– a 21% response rate.  
Surveys 1 and 2 were then combined to produce the first set of estimates (Mail Survey in 
table 2). 
The second set of estimates utilizes data collected by researchers at Rice 
University.
9  This survey targeted Katrina evacuees in Houston, TX, and consists of three 
waves of self-administered questionnaires over a one year period.  The first wave focused 
on individuals located in evacuation shelters throughout Houston in early September 
2005.  The second wave occurred in late October through early November of 2005 in 
motels and apartment complexes in the city.  The third wave occurred in July 2006 in 
apartment complexes.  In all, we utilize 756 observations between the three waves of 
data.  Wilson and Stein (2006) compare descriptive statistics for each wave to other 
surveys investigating Katrina evacuees in Houston.  For a detailed description of the 
survey methodology, see Wilson and Stein (2006). 
We use logistic regressions to analyze evacuees’ stated preference decision to 
return to their pre-disaster residence after Hurricane Katrina.  It is assumed that the 
probability of return depends on a set of individual and household characteristics 
according to a logistic cumulative distribution function as follows: 
                                                 
9 The Houston evacuee study was sponsored by the National Science Foundation (SES 0552439) “SGER: 
Cooperation among evacuees in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.”  The grant was awarded to Dr. Rick 
Wilson, chair of the Department of Political Science and the Herbert S. Autrey Professor of Political 
Science and Professor of Statistics and Psychology at Rice University. 
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where   is the probability that an evacuee returns to the pre-Katrina 
residence given a vector of individual and household characteristics x, and Λ represents 
the logistic cumulative distribution function.  The parameters β are estimated by method 
of maximum likelihood.   
) 1 Pr( = return
The vector x varies across our datasets, but in general includes income level of the 
household, labor characteristics of the household, indicators of cultural and social 
connection to the previous place of residence, and demographic characteristics.  For the 
entire population of Hurricane Katrina evacuees, we expect that income will have a 
positive effect on the likelihood of returning, reflecting access to financial resources to 
aid in return and recovery.  Important labor characteristics could include work history and 
experience, such as whether members of the household are currently employed and 
whether they were employed before the disaster.  Household social and cultural 
connection indicators could include length of residence at the home location, inter-
generational connections to the home area, and membership in a race-ethnic group that 
has special significance in the home area.  Demographic characteristics that might affect 
the return migration decision include age, education, marital status, and household size.  
Lastly, the real wage differential (Ci) for the household’s skill level and job classification 
associated with the home and host locations could be included in the specification of (5). 
Unlike the linear regression model, the parameter estimates for the logit model are 
interpreted as the rate of change in the log odds of return as the characteristics change, 
  16which is not very intuitive.  Therefore, the marginal effects of the individual and 
household characteristics on the probability of return are also calculated, as follows 
(Greene 2003):  
. )] ' Λ( 1 )[ ' Λ(
Pr







                                          (6)  
The marginal effects are evaluated at the observed mean values, which are reported in 
table 1.  For dummy variables marginal effects are computed using the change in the 
probabilities. 
Table 1 reveals striking differences across our two samples.  The mail sample 
corresponds with higher income, more highly educated, and an older population.  This 
population also has less African Americans than the Houston sample.
10  Almost a third of 
the mail sample lived in the New Orleans metropolitan area prior to Hurricane Katrina, 
while the Houston sample is predominantly composed of evacuees from New Orleans 
(92%).  Six percent of mail survey respondents claimed to have Acadian (or “Cajun”) 
heritage.  For the subset of mail data for which we had measures of social connection 
(survey 2), 35% of respondents report that they were born in the parish or county in 
which they lived before Hurricane Katrina.  We construe this as a proxy for connection to 
place.  Sixty-five percent of the Houston sample was engaged in the labor force before 
Hurricane Katrina.  A small proportion, 13%, owned their own home, and the average 
respondent had lived in the New Orleans area (or some other part of the affected region) 
                                                 
10 While summary statistics for race are not provided with the Houston data, most of the respondents to this 
survey were African Americans. 
  17for 26 years.  Intentions to return across the two populations are significantly different—
88% for the mail survey versus 29% for the Houston survey. 
We report two sets of estimation results: the first based on the mail surveys 
conducted by Center for Natural Hazards Research at East Carolina University and 
second based on self administered questionnaires of Katrina evacuees living in Houston, 
TX.   Table 2 reports the logistic regression estimation results for the mail data. The 
explanatory variables in the estimated model are jointly significant (χ
2=92.15).  Results 
indicate that household income before Katrina, whether their residence was located in the 
New Orleans metropolitan area, whether the respondent is a senior citizen, and whether 
the respondent was born in the parish/county in which they lived before the storm have a 
statistically significant influence on the evacuee’s return decision.  The coefficient of 
household income is positive, indicating that higher income households are more likely to 
return to their pre-Katrina residence, but the influence diminishes with income (negative 
quadratic term).   
Controlling for the percentage of damage in a county, residents of the New 
Orleans metropolitan area are less likely to return home, all else being equal.  New 
Orleans residents are 7% less likely to return.  Senior citizens are almost 5% less likely to 
return.  The parish-born parameter estimate is negative, indicating that those respondents 
that were born in the parish or county in which they lived before Katrina are less likely to 
return.  This result is counter to our expectations, as we envisioned this covariate as an 
indicator of social connection to place, which would lead us to expect a positive 
coefficient.  In any event, the marginal effect is not statistically significant.  Lastly, the 
  18economic impact dataset (survey 1) exhibited a higher likelihood of return.   
Unfortunately, due to missing and inconsistent data, we were not able to record wage 
differentials corresponding with the home and host region for the mail sample. 
Table 2 also reports the estimation results for the Houston data set.  Results 
indicate that education level, age, employment status, marital status, and home ownership 
influence the likelihood of return.  Respondents with at least a college level education 
and those under the age of 30 are less likely to return.  Respondents that were working 
before Katrina are more likely to return home, as are married respondents.  Home 
ownership has a significant influence on the likelihood of return, increasing the 
probability by 21%.
11
The Houston model also includes the wage differential.  For this dataset, the real 
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where   denotes an hourly mean wage in Houston and the home location 
(primarily New Orleans), respectively, for j labor classification in May 2005, and 






                                                 
11 For the Houston dataset, we also estimated an ordered logit regression using the 
dependent variable with the values of very unlikely, somewhat unlikely, somewhat likely, 
and highly likely categories.  The sign and significance of most coefficients are the same 
as the logit regression.  We only report the results from the logit regression in order to 
compare the results with the mail survey.      
  19respectively, as of May 2005.
12  The average real wage differential was $1.55 per hour, 
indicating that, on average, households in the Houston sample could earn more money by 
staying in the Houston area.  The coefficient on wage differential is negative and 
statistically significant.  A $1 increase in the wage differential decreases the likelihood of 
return by almost 6%.  We use equation (4) to calculate average WTP to return home.  Our 
point estimate is $1.94 per hour (2005 USD) with a 95% confidence interval of $1.79 and 
$2.30 (Krinsky and Robb 1986).  The dummy variable indicating the New Orleans 
metropolitan area captures site specific amenity affects of return migration for the 
majority of the sample vis-à-vis other Gulf locations.  Beyond this dichotomy for the 
return location, our WTP measure assumes no intra-site variation in location-specific 
amenities (i.e., homogeneity of amenities within the Houston and home sites) and 
homogeneity of amenity perceptions within the population of interest.
 13     
6. Discussion 
Our results provide insight into the return migration decision of households that 
have been displaced due to natural disaster.  The displacement of people can have major 
social, psychological, and economic implications.  Researchers have examined the 
evacuation decision, the impact that evacuees have upon their host region, and social and 
psychological impacts of the disaster and displacement upon evacuees.  There has been 
                                                 
12 The wage data come from the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, the 
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program.  The data provided wage estimates 
for over 800 occupations by geographic area (http://www.bls.gov/oes/home.htm). 
13 Variation in amenities within sites is largely unobserved because of data limitations.  
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14 on an important aspect of recovery—which households will 
subsequently return and why?  Our sense is that many have assumed in the past that all or 
most evacuees will return, but this is not necessarily so, especially for large disasters that 
cause mass destruction and highlight the vulnerability of a particular area.  Damage from 
the disaster, perceptions of vulnerability of the home community, expectations of 
economic conditions, the behavior of family and friends, and connections to place could 
all influence the likelihood of return.  The magnitude and composition of the returning 
population has implications for disaster recovery. 
We postulate a simple benefit-cost structure on the return decision in order to 
conduct empirical analysis of two unique datasets.  The first corresponds with evacuees 
from the Gulf region that responded to one of two mail surveys.  While the mail surveys 
were designed for primarily other purposes (to measure evacuation behavior and 
expenditures in one case, and opinions of rebuilding project in the other), we are able to 
assess the respondent’s intentions of returning to their home after evacuation.  The 
adjusted overall response rate to these two surveys is approximately 22%.  We make no 
claim that this sample is representative of households in the Gulf region.  Nonetheless, 
we can assess what influences the likelihood of return in order to learn something about 
the decision making process.   
Our results suggests that household income influences the likelihood of return, 
though the marginal effect is rather small—a one thousand dollar increase in household 
                                                 
14 Elliott and Pais (2006) are the only authors that we are aware of to examine the return 
migration decision in a quantitative framework.  Falk, Hunt, and Hunt (2006) speculate 
on how the demographics of New Orleans might change in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina. 
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Orleans are 7% less likely to return home. The metropolitan area includes counties most 
heavily damaged by Katrina; however, estimates suggest that the percent of houses with 
damage does not significantly affect overall likelihood of return.  Given the non-uniform 
damage distributions within a county, the county level aggregation in this covariate could 
be a source of inaccuracy.  A particularly vulnerable group, senior citizens are less likely 
to return to their home (marginal effect = 5%).  This result could reflect heightened 
perceptions of vulnerability in this population. 
We were surprised to find that individuals born in the parish or county in which 
they lived before Katrina were less likely to return, though the marginal effect for this 
variable was not statistically significant.  We hypothesized that sense of place would be 
stronger among these individuals, and thus likelihood of return would be greater, but the 
data do not support this contention.  Indicator variables for parents being born in the 
county (or a nearby county) in which the individual lived proved to have no influence on 
the pattern of return migration responses.  Moreover, those that consider themselves 
“Cajun” (Acadian) are no more likely to return than other respondents.  Research 
suggests a possible explanation for this finding—the extent of damage tends to cause 
more distress to people with deep roots in a particular environment (Albrecht 2006).  
Thus, those with deeper connections to place may be more highly traumatized leading to 
a lower likelihood of return. 
Our results for the mail sample differ somewhat from those of Elliott and Pais 
(2006).  They examine the return migration decision with interval-scaled data and OLS, 
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home was destroyed influence the return migration decision.  However, they find that 
income has a negative effect on the likelihood of return, as does loss of home, while 
home ownership has a positive effect.  They find no influence of age or place of 
residence (New Orleans versus other Gulf Coast communities) on return migration.   
African Americans are no more or less likely to return in their model; we find similar 
results with regard to race. 
Our second dataset corresponds with primarily minority Katrina evacuees in 
Houston, TX.  Our logistic regression results suggest that education, age, employment 
status, marital status, and home ownership influence the likelihood of return.   
Respondents with at least a college level education are 7% less likely to return home than 
are the less educated.  Those under the age of 30 are 11% less likely to return.   
Respondents that were working before Katrina are 9% more likely to return home than 
those that were not working, and married respondents are 11% more likely to return 
home.  Similar to Elliott and Pais (2006) home ownership has a large influence on the 
likelihood of return, increasing the probability by 21%.  Household income has no effect 
on the likelihood of return for this sample, nor does the number of years that the 
respondent lived in the area prior to evacuation.  The former coefficient likely reflects the 
low variability of income in the Houston data; the latter covariate was included as a 
proxy for connection to place, and again we find little support for this aspect influencing 
the likelihood of return.  Neither of our models finds that the extent of damage in a 
county influence return migration, but there could be error in this variable (as noted 
above). 
  23With the Houston dataset, we examine not only the influence of household 
characteristics, but also individual-specific wage differentials.  The economic literature 
on migration has long recognized that labor market conditions influence migration 
patterns, as do the prices of location-specific goods and the levels of spatial amenities.  In 
a world of homogeneous agents with perfect information, with no connection to place, 
and in which moving was costless and could be instantaneously realized, the equilibrium 
levels of wages and rents should adjust to reflect the value of location-specific amenities 
(Roback 1982).  Under these conditions utility levels of consumers and profits of firms 
would be equalized across space.  Wages would be higher and land rents lower in areas 
with poor amenities, while amenity rich locations would pay lower wages and witness 
higher land rents. 
A number of migration studies have found persistent differentials in wages across 
regions while controlling for amenities (Clark and Cosgrove 1991; Greenwood et al. 
1991).  Cultural constraints are one factor that could foster persistent wage differentials 
(Frey and Liaw 2005).  Individual need for social support networks, kinship ties, and 
access to informal employment opportunities could influence migration patterns.   
Information flows are influenced by social networks, which could inhibit or distort 
knowledge of prices, wages, and amenities at other locations.  Connection to place in 
which an individual has lived may also inhibit out-migration. 
We include a number of proxies for connection to place (which for our purposes 
could relate to sense or identity, kinship ties, social networks, or other cultural 
constraints) in our regression models.  We fine little influence of these factors on the 
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migration decision, the poor quality of our proxies, or mis-specification of the place 
phenomenon in our regression models.  Nonetheless, we are able to make inferences 
about the value of returning home using individual-specific wage differentials for the 
Houston sample. 
Real wage differentials are the differences in hourly earnings at home and host 
locations for a respondent’s job class, controlling for home and host region price levels.  
The average (median) real wage differential is $1.55 ($0.71) per hour, ranging from -
$5.74 to $12.78.  Less than 5% of the wage differentials were negative, implying that 
Houston offers higher real wages for the overwhelming majority of the evacuees.  While 
we are unable to control for amenity levels across the home and host region, we do find 
the expected negative effect of wage differential on the likelihood of return.  Since a 
larger wage difference implies that the individual faces higher opportunity cost of return, 
we interpret the wage differential as an implicit price of return.  It is an estimate of the 
amount of hourly income that they must give up to return home.   
Our willingness to pay model in (2-4) formalizes the relationship between the 
economic benefit of returning home and the cost implied by the wage differential.  The 
Houston data suggest that some evacuees choose to return home despite the fact that they 
could earn a higher wage at their host location.  In this sense, Hurricane Katrina provides 
a natural experiment for analyzing migration decisions.  Individuals that might have 
never left their home are suddenly presented with the opportunity to migrate by making 
their evacuation decision permanent.  The natural disaster provides an exogenous shock 
  25to the spatial pattern of labor that may allow one to assess the underlying causes of 
persistent wage differentials. 
We employ the WTP formula in (4) to estimate the benefit of returning home.  
Our results suggest that the average individual is willing to sacrifice $1.94 an hour in 
higher wages to return home, with a 95% confidence interval of $1.79 and $2.30 (2005 
USD).  For an individual employed full-time, this implies an annual willingness to pay of 
$3,954 (95% confidence interval $3,651 - $4,692).  While connection to place as we have 
defined it may not be the factor motivating return migration, the data suggest that 
something draws individuals to return home in the face of real and significant economic 
cost.   
7. Conclusion 
Natural disasters can unleash widespread death and destruction, displace hundreds 
of thousands of people, and cause major interruptions in the everyday economic life of 
still greater populations.  Economists have examined evacuation, recovery, and transition, 
but have not looked at the microeconomic decision of displaced households to return 
home.  We explore the evacuation-migration decisions of Hurricane Katrina survivors 
using two unique datasets that include stated preferences on return migration.  For a 
sample of evacuees in various locations, we find that household income increases the 
likelihood of returning home.  This result is in line with our expectations, as households 
with higher income have better resources to make the return trip, are more likely to own 
homes in areas less likely to have been flooded, and have better resources to rebuild in 
the event that their home has been damaged.  However, this result differs from the only 
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income and likelihood of return (Elliott and Pais 2006).  Senior citizens and residents of 
metropolitan New Orleans are less likely to return home.  Percentage of damaged homes 
in a county does not influence the likelihood of return, but the aggregate level of this 
measure complicates interpretation. 
Our second model deals with a dataset of evacuees in Houston, TX. The Houston 
evacuee data represent quite a unique population: the sample has a third of respondents 
with a less than high school education, is overwhelmingly African American (over 98%), 
and almost half of the respondents report income less than $15,000 per year.  For this 
population, we find that education and youthfulness (being under 30 years of age) 
decrease the likelihood of return, while those that were employed before Katrina, those 
that are married and that own a house are more likely to return.  Home ownership has the 
large influence on the likelihood of return, increasing the probability by 21%.  These sets 
of results are useful in their own right in that they provide insight into the nature of the 
return migration decision, allow one to make inferences about how the economic and 
cultural recovery of an area may proceed, and suggest policies that might aid in recovery.   
For the Houston sample, we are also capable of exploring the relationship 
between wage differentials in the home and host region and the likelihood of return.  We 
examine wage differentials in light of the literature on economic migration, in which 
households are assumed to sort over space according to wages, the prices of location-
specific commodities (e.g. land), and spatial amenities.  The persistence of significant 
wage differentials after controlling for land rents and spatial amenities suggests that there 
  27could be some component of behavior that forestalls spatial arbitrage.  Cultural 
constraints, such as kinship relations or connection to place (Frey and Liaw 2005), could 
operate to inhibit migration.   
While we find no evidence that proxies for what we call “connection to place” 
affect the likelihood of return migration in either of our datasets, we do find that 
households do intend to return home in spite of real economic costs in terms of real wage 
differentials across the home and host location.  We exploit individual variation in wage 
differentials to estimate the impact on the likelihood of return and find a statistically 
significant and negative effect—those that face higher opportunity costs of return in 
terms of higher relative real wages in Houston tend to stay in Houston, while those that 
face lower or negative opportunity costs tend to return.  The fact that some individuals 
will accept lower wages to return provides a signal of value that one could attribute to 
returning home.  For the sample of Houston evacuees, we estimate that the average 
household is willing to give up $1.94 per hour to return home.  Assuming that the earning 
individual works full time, this corresponds with an annual WTP of $3,954.  These 
numbers are limited in their applicability due to the unique characteristics of the Houston 
sample, but the results are encouraging and suggest that this approach should be explored 
further with other datasets. 
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  34Table 1. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Mail Survey  Houston Survey  Variable Description 
Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.
RETURN  Returning to pre-Katrina residence (=1)  0.887  0.316  0.290  0.454
INCOME  Household annual income in thousand 
dollars 
51.434 32.560  18.704 15.887
COLLEGE  Attended college (=1) 0.430  0.495  0.328  0.470
UNDER30  Age under 30 (=1)  0.208 0.406  0.640 0.480
SENIOR  Age over 63 (=1)  0.256  0.437  0.008  0.089
NOMA  Residence located within the New Orleans 
Metropolitan area 
0.316 0.465  0.923 0.266
PERCDAM  Percent of damaged property in county  0.449  0.232  0.452  0.214
MALE  Gender answered as male (=1)  0.540  0.499  0.508  0.500
BLACK  Race-ethnic group answered as black (=1)   0.129  0.335   
CAJUN  Race-ethnic group answered as Cajun (=1)  0.067  0.250   
IMPACT  Observation from Economic Impact 
survey (survey 1 of mail portion)*  (=1) 
0.677 0.468   
PARISH  Born in parish/county of residence* (=1)  0.348  0.478   
WORKING  Employed before Katrina (=1)      0.652  0.477
MARRIED Married  (=1)    0.171  0.376
CHILDREN  Number of children    2.015  1.803
OWNHOME  Own home residence (=1)    0.128  0.335
LIVEDYR  Number of years lived in New Orleans    25.737  8.963
WAGEDIFF  Real wage difference by labor class 
(Houston wage – NOLA wage) 
     1.553  2.049
Notes: The summary statistics for the mail survey is based on 746 observations.  The sample size 
for the Houston survey is 756. * IMPACT data did not record information on social/family 
connections to the home location; descriptive statistics for PARISH correspond with the subset of 
the mail data that recorded social/family connections (n=241). 
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Mail Survey  Houston Survey 
Variable 











CONSTANT  1.005 0.649      -2.239 0.595  -0.440 0.114
INCOME  0.040** 0.016  0.003** 0.001 0.003 0.015  0.000 0.003
INCOME2  -3.0e-04** 1.2e-04 -2.0e-05** 1.0e-05 -7.1e-06 1.9e-04 -1.4e-06 3.8e-05
COLLEGE  0.297 0.294  0.02 0.019 -0.397* 0.203  -0.075** 0.037
UNDER30  0.113 0.351  0.007 0.022 -0.561** 0.180  -0.114** 0.037
SENIOR  -0.607* 0.331  -0.047** 0.029 0.329 0.861  0.069 0.192
NOMA  -0.976** 0.346  -0.078** 0.032 1.054** 0.400  0.163** 0.045
PERCDAM  -0.31 0.738  -0.021  0.05 0.473 0.402  0.093 0.079
MALE  0.265 0.256  0.018 0.018 -0.052 0.176  -0.010 0.035
BLACK  0.229 0.409  0.014 0.024        
CAJUN  -0.134 0.57 -0.009  0.042        
PARISH  -0.649*# 0.34 -0.055  0.035        
IMPACT  1.428** 0.374  0.124**  0.04        
WORKING         0.672** 0.219  0.125** 0.039
MARRIED         0.544** 0.222  0.115** 0.050
CHILDREN         0.037 0.049  0.007 0.010
OWNHOME         0.962** 0.254  0.214** 0.061
LIVEDYR         0.009 0.010  0.002 0.002
WAGEDIFF        -0.287** 0.059  -0.056** 0.012
Obs.  746           756         
Pseudo-R2  0.176       0.086      
Log-L  -216.458           -415.679         
Notes: * indicates significance at 10% level.  ** indicates significance at 5% level.  Marginal effects 
of the dummy variables are computed using the changes in the probabilities.  Otherwise, marginal 
effects are evaluated at those observed means.  # The PARISH variable is set = 0 for the IMPACT 
sample. 
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